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Abstract 
 
What explains individual support for redistribution among regions within a country? Building 
on extant models, we hypothesize that such preferences are affected by regional income, condi-
tioned by individual income and political ideology. We test hypotheses with an experiment em-
bedded in a nationally representative survey in Spain, where we randomly inform some citizens 
of the true relative income of their region. The effect of this information is therefore akin to 
changes in relative regional income. We find that citizens' learning about a region's relative po-
sition affects preferences for redistribution; specifically, low-income respondents in relatively 
well-off regions become particularly against inter-regional redistribution. The effects of regional 
income are moderated by political ideology and priming of "out group" regions. The findings 
have implications for debates about the applicability of economic models to explaining support 
for regional arrangements, and about the role of second-dimensional "identity" politics. 
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What explains citizen preferences for 
redistribution across regions within a 
country? Around the world, countries 
vary greatly in how much central gov-
ernments tax wealthier regions to redis-
tribute to poorer ones in order to reduce 
inequality across regions. In many feder-
ations or multi-tiered polities, these is-
sues are salient, electorally contested, 
and at times polarizing; they have some-
times led to demands for or attempts at 
secession from disaffected regions.  Such 
issues have been politicized in wealthy 
countries including Belgium, Canada, 
Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, as 
well as in poorer or middle-income states 
including Argentina, Brazil, China, In-
dia, Mexico, and Russia. Yet the recent 
growth in research on the causes and 
consequences of different federal ar-
rangements and fiscal federalism have 
not studied in depth the roots of individ-
ual preferences over basic issues related 
to federal institutions and fiscal federal-
ism.  This omission is surprising given 
the high salience of this package of is-
sues in such countries.  
 
In this paper we address this omission 
by specifying and testing propositions 
about individual preferences over a key 
aspect of fiscal federalism: inter-
regional redistribution. Consistent with 
a variety of extant theoretical models, 
we hypothesize that regional and indi-
vidual income should explain variation 
in preferences for inter-regional redis-
tribution.  We build on this literature by 
hypothesizing that individual-level in-
formation about regional income posi-
tions should also affect preferences. We 
also argue that the role of this infor-
mation on such preferences may be 
conditionally relevant given the sali-
ence of non-economic factors (i.e. iden-
tity issues) and political ideology.  
 
We focus on evidence regarding such 
preferences in Spain, because it is an im-
portant illustrative case where much re-
distribution across regions (Autonomous 
Communities or ACs)2 exists, and where 
regional redistribution and concerns 
about regional autonomy have become 
more intensively politically contested 
and salient over the last decade.  We test 
our hypotheses with a novel experiment 
embedded in a large nationally repre-
sentative sample of Spain with an over-
sample in Catalonia. Catalonia is a re-
gion with a distinct national and linguis-
tic identity, where cultural and fiscal au-
tonomy demands are an integral part of 
the public debate. 
 
We assess how knowledgeable citizens are 
about their own region’s relative income 
position and whether informing citizens of 
their region’s relative income position af-
fects their preferences for regional redistri-
bution. We also see how individuals’ eval-
uating other regions’ incomes alters these 
preferences. Our experimental research 
design allows us to leverage randomiza-
tion of two commonly cited interventions 
that are theorized to affect policy prefer-
Introduction 
2 We use the terms “regions” and “ACs” inter-
changeably. 
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ences in other contexts: information that is 
domain relevant (in this case, the respond-
ent’s regional relative income), and prim-
ing of relevant “out-group” or “in-group” 
categories. The impact of information on 
the respondent’s regional relative income 
can be thought of as exogenously manipu-
lating a region’s relative income, as some 
citizens learn that their region is either 
poorer or richer than previously thought. 
This allows us to isolate the causal impact 
of actual changes in relative regional in-
come on preferences.  
 
Overall, we find the following: 1) region-
al income alone is a minimal factor in 
accounting for regional redistribution 
preferences; 2) however, learning about 
one’s regional position affects prefer-
ences for regional distribution in direc-
tions consistent with some theoretical 
models (specifically, low income re-
spondents in wealthier regions become 
less favorable of inter-regional redistribu-
tion if they learn that their region is richer 
than they thought); 3) the effects of infor-
mation are moderated by political ideolo-
gy and out-group priming. We do not find 
similar informational effects in Catalonia, 
though we find evidence of some priming 
effects. These findings have implications 
for the growing comparative politics liter-
ature on fiscal federalism and the dynam-
ics of decentralization (Rodden 2006, 
Bakke and Wibbels 2007, Beramendi 
2012).  The results provide firmer micro-
foundations about the formation of public 
opinion on such issues and, more specifi-
cally, about how such preferences are af-
fected by information, ideology, and out-
group priming.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 
one describes the relevant literature and 
our hypotheses; section two describes 
the design; section three describes the 
results in the control group; section four 
describes the experimental results; sec-
Section 1: Background & Hypotheses 
Relevant literature 
 
Research in fiscal federalism and decen-
tralization has progressed in explaining 
cross-national variation of the amount of 
fiscal redistribution across regions, the 
differing amounts of decentralized au-
thority across states, and the related out-
comes of successful and/or violent re-
gional autonomy movements. The fiscal 
federalism literature in particular focuses 
on the institutional determinants of why 
federations redistribute among regions 
more than others. A main conclusion of 
this literature is that economic theories 
alone cannot account for this cross-
national variation, and that “initially une-
qual” federations redistribute less than 
initially equal federations (Beramendi, 
2012; Rodden, 2010; Rodden, 2006); 
countries often do not adopt the most effi-
cient forms of decentralization as predict-
ed by classic models (e.g. Oates, 1999).3 
3 Correlates of higher inter-regional redistribution 
include proportional electoral systems, larger elec-
toral districts, less powerful second chambers, 
cohesive national parties (Rodden 2010; Rodden 
and Wibbels 2010).  
3 
 
However, in much of this literature, the 
underlying theoretical models explaining 
the amount of redistribution across re-
gions are partially based on assumptions 
about citizen preferences over these out-
comes.  Yet no study tests these assump-
tions, in contrast to the voluminous litera-
ture on preferences for inter-personal re-
distribution. For example, in models such 
as those by Bolton and Roland (1997), the 
amount of regional autonomy depends on 
preferences of voters of regions of differ-
ent incomes; in models of secession such 
as those by Alesina et al. (2005), voters 
have preferences over taxes and over pub-
lic goods provision. In more recent work, 
Beramendi (2012) assumes that voters’ 
regional redistribution and fiscal decen-
tralization preferences are conditioned by 
individual and regional-level income. 
 
An overlapping literature on regional 
autonomy movements also has a dearth 
of individual-level data testing assump-
tions of models.  These models more ex-
plicitly incorporate “identity” prefer-
ences or views of the out-group, but as 
with the fiscal federalism literature, there 
remains little empirical testing of such 
assumptions. Much of the empirical pro-
gress on this question follows from mod-
els about the economic optimality of au-
tonomy or secession (Alesina et al. 2005; 
Bolton and Roland 1997; Bordignon, 
Manasse, and Tabellini 2001). Some 
studies posit a correlation between con-
servative ideology and hostility towards 
immigrants, other “out-groups,” and 
even redistribution if it is perceived that 
redistribution goes principally to unde-
serving out-groups (Klor and Shayo 
2010; Billiet, Eisinga, and Scheepers 
1996; Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; 
Duckitt, Wagner, Plessis, and Birum 
2002; Hodson and Costello 2007; Petti-
grew and Meertens 1995). However, this 
literature on negative affinity for out-
groups does not consider such attitudes 
in a regional redistribution context. 
 
Much of the empirical testing in these 
literatures instead has been in the domain 
of either cross-national or regional-level 
data on fiscal transfers and regional au-
tonomy demands, or on qualitative test-
ing of these theories. Extant public opin-
ion work in fiscal federalism mostly ex-
amines attitudes about “federalism” gen-
erally (e.g. Petersen, et al. 2008).  Relat-
ed studies on individual preferences on 
autonomy movements document strong 
correlations between regional identity 
and support for regional autonomy, but 
focus less on regional redistribution. 
 
A final limitation of the existing scant 
public opinion research on regional redis-
tribution is that it ignores the importance 
of information in preference formation. 
Simple information has been found to 
change preferences in other specific poli-
cy contexts (see Duflo and Saez (2003) 
and Chetty and Saez (2009) as examples 
in US micro policy contexts). The fact 
that citizens may not be informed about 
the relative income of the region they live 
in enables us to test whether information 
affects views on regional redistribution. 
Many of the theoretical assumptions un-
derpinning basic models of regional re-
distribution assume citizens have full in-
formation about their region’s position in 
the overall income distribution, which 
remains an untested assumption.  
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We address these limitations and the rel-
ative absence of individual-level data in 
these literatures by focusing on prefer-
ences for regional redistribution and in-
formation about regional income. Are 
individuals in richer regions opposed 
redistribution to poorer regions, as is 
commonly assumed? What is the rela-
tionship between individual and regional 
income for such preferences? 
 
Relevance of the Spanish context 
 
Spain is an especially instructive case be-
cause the issues of inter-regional redistribu-
tion and the current push for fiscal autono-
my from Catalonia are politically salient 
issues.  Political polarization in Spain exists 
more over territorial issues than traditional 
inter-personal redistribution issues (Colo-
mer 1998, Fernández-Albertos and Manza-
no 2012). Public opinion in Catalonia over 
the last 15 years has drifted towards less 
support for regional transfers and more sup-
port for fiscal autonomy for this region 
(Amat 2012; de la Fuente 2011). The cur-
rent political discourse in Catalonia is that 
the net transfers from Catalonia to other 
Spanish regions are an important cause of 
the ongoing debt crisis of the Catalan re-
gional government, and that increased fis-
cal autonomy would alleviate economic 
problems of this region. In July 2012, the 
Catalan regional government approved a 
bill in favor of reaching of a “Fiscal Pact” 
with Spain, which would have allowed Cat-
alonia to have an independent tax revenue 
agency; this pact was rejected by the Span-
ish central government.   
 
Additionally, in Spain much academic 
and political controversy exists over the 
amount of income that is taxed in some 
ACs and transferred to others 
(Beramendi 2012; de la Fuente 2011; 
León 2007, 2009). Some argue that the 
system over-equalizes regional incomes, 
leaving relatively richer regions in worse 
off position as compared to relatively 
poorer regions, post-transfers (Paluzie 
2010, 364-367), and that such regional 
transfers generate perverse incentives for 
subsidized regions (Montasell and 
Sánchez 2012).4 Others counter that re-
gional transfers within Spain have stabi-
lizing effects that benefit the national 
economy, and that richer regions should 
be obligated to transfer more to poorer 
ones (de la Fuente 2011). 
 
Hypotheses 
 
We focus on two sets of hypotheses of 
individual preferences for regional redis-
tribution, building on the literatures de-
scribed above. The first set focuses on 
the roles of regional and individual in-
come. In the discussion of our design, 
we elaborate on how the provision of 
information tests the impact of infor-
mation on such preferences, but also 
how the manipulation of information al-
so has the effect of exogenously chang-
ing an individual’s relative regional in-
come, allowing us to better isolate the 
impact of regional income on prefer-
ences. We also examine how other indi-
vidual characteristics theorized to be cor-
related with support for individual redis-
4 Beramendi (2012) in Chapter 7 provides an 
efficient summary of the development of the 
system of inter-region fiscal transfers and decen-
tralized institutional change in Spain.  
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tribution, such as ideology, moderate the 
impact of this information. The second 
set of hypotheses focuses on regions as 
potential out-groups and the role of sec-
ond-dimensional politics.  
 
Regarding the first set of hypotheses, we 
build on basic models of inter-regional 
redistribution, which draw on models of 
individual level preferences for taxes and 
transfers. A naive expectation is that in-
dividuals in richer regions should be 
more opposed to regional redistribution:  
 
H1: Citizens in richer (poor) re-
gions should be less (more) sup-
portive of redistribution from 
richer to poorer regions 
 
However, recent models of fiscal feder-
alism emphasize the role of individual as 
well as regional income, in particular the 
recent innovative examination of the po-
litical underpinnings of fiscal centraliza-
tion and regional redistribution by 
Beramendi (2012). His theoretical 
framework is one of the few to explicitly 
incorporate individual-level preferences 
over these outcomes, by distinguishing 
poor versus rich individuals in poor and 
rich regions.5 We build on the basic 
framework which derives individual 
preferences for the amount of fiscal de-
centralization, and implicitly, the amount 
of inter-regional redistribution, from re-
gional income, individual income, and 
the amount of inequality in a region. If 
we consider the four quadrants of rich 
versus poor individuals in rich versus 
poor regions, another straightforward 
expectation regarding inter-regional re-
distribution is that the two “extremes” of 
these quadrants should have more oppos-
ing views.  This leads to the hypotheses: 
  
H2a: Richer citizens in richer 
regions should be less supportive 
of redistribution from richer to 
poorer regions 
 
H2b: Poorer citizens in poorer 
regions should be more support-
ive of redistribution from richer 
to poorer regions 
 
What about potentially cross-pressured 
individuals, the poor citizens in rich re-
gions and rich citizens in poor regions? 
We hypothesize that poor individuals in 
rich regions should also be more op-
posed to regional redistribution. First, as 
they are potential beneficiaries of redis-
tribution, they should be expected to be 
against redistributive schemes that target 
a group of beneficiaries that explicitly 
excludes them. Second, if regional redis-
tribution is understood as a transfer to 
poor regions financed through a flat tax 
on residents on rich ones, poor individu-
als in rich regions should be most hostile 
to such transfers. Finally, as Beramendi 
argues, in richer regions that are more 
equal relative to the union, poor individ-
uals in rich regions should be more op-
posed to centralization structures (and 
thus regional redistribution) because they 
5 For Beramendi, the main political variables 
explaining cross-national variation in the degree 
of decentralization are aspects of national-level 
political institutions and inter-regional differ-
ences. We focus on individual preferences and 
set aside country-level factors such as average 
labor mobility or the nature of the representation 
system.  
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will be more harmed from centralized 
redistribution, as the net beneficiaries 
would be those living in poorer regions.  
 
Similarly, we expect that rich individuals 
in poor regions might be more supportive 
of regional redistribution, as the net trans-
fers can take the form of public goods 
that uniformly benefit the population of 
the poor region. Further, as predicted by 
Beramendi, such citizens in more unequal 
regions are more likely to support central-
ization and regional redistribution, as this 
reduces the political demand for intra-
regional redistribution.6 Hence: 
 
H2c: Poorer citizens in richer 
regions should be less supportive 
of redistribution from richer to 
poorer regions 
 
H2d: Richer citizens in poorer 
regions should be more support-
ive of redistribution from richer 
to poorer regions 
 
We now turn to hypotheses that go be-
yond basic individual and regional in-
come factors. One of the main assump-
tions of all previous models of such pref-
erences is that citizens are informed of 
their region’s relative income. We detail 
in the design section how the fact that re-
spondents are not fully informed about 
regional relative income permits us to test 
the impact of information about regional 
income on preferences. Our design, by 
manipulating information, simulates the 
effect of changing a citizens’ relative re-
gional income, because they learn the true 
position of their region’s position. This 
allows us to test the causal impact of a 
change in relative regional income.  
Broadly, we expect the following:  
 
H3: Citizens who learn that their 
region is poorer (richer) will be 
more (less) supportive of region-
al redistribution compared to 
those who do not learn 
 
For reasons of brevity, we do not elabo-
rate on H3 for all expected combinations 
regarding individual and regional income 
described in H2, but discuss these exten-
sions in the results section.   
 
We also hypothesize that, consistent with 
the vast literature on inter-personal redis-
tribution, political ideology should affect 
views of regional redistribution. This 
could be due to higher sensitivity of left-
wing individuals to issues and infor-
mation regarding redistribution (Jacoby 
1991, Goren 2004). 
6 See Chapter 2 in Beramendi (2012) for a full dis-
cussion of how regional inequality affects prefer-
ences. Our general predictions of regional redistri-
bution in hypothesis 2 are not dependent on as-
sumptions about regional inequality. But the Span-
ish case offers some advantages in this respect be-
cause the regional wealth and inequality patterns 
are consistent in a way that allows us to test hy-
potheses consistent with Beramendi’s framework. 
There is a strong correlation between intra-regional 
inequality and regional per capita income; all of the 
Spanish regions with a per capita income above the 
median (except for Castile and Leon, the eighth 
wealthiest region) have lower levels of inequality 
than the mean across regions, and all regions below 
the median but (except for one, Murcia) have high-
er levels of inequality than the regional mean. Data 
are compiled by using Household Survey Data 
from the Spanish Statistical National Institute 
(INE).  See also Aldás et al. (2007) and Beramendi 
(2012): 188.  
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H4a: Left-wing individuals are 
more supportive of regional re-
distribution; left-wing individuals 
will be more supportive of redis-
tribution if they learn their re-
gion is poorer 
 
H4b: Right-wing individuals are 
less supportive of regional redis-
tribution; right-wing individuals 
will be less supportive of redistri-
bution if they learn their region is 
richer  
 
A second set of hypotheses is derived 
from the literature on identity or out-
group concerns and support for redistri-
bution, summarized in the previous sec-
tion. These models generally predict 
that cultural identity salience of the out-
group should dampen support for redis-
tribution towards that group. 
 
H5: Citizens who are primed to 
consider their in-group (the out-
group) will be more (less) sup-
portive of regional redistribution 
  
Note that H5 is not dependent on any par-
ticular assumption of whether the citizen 
views the out-group region to be a richer or 
poorer region. But, we hypothesize that 
priming of out-group regions that are 
wealthier (i.e. Catalonia and the Basque 
Country in the case of Spain) is likely to 
increase support for regional redistribution 
for citizens outside those regions because 
people are more willing to receive redistri-
bution from these out-groups; the relative 
position of the out-group region in the re-
gional income distribution is generally 
common knowledge.  The directional pre-
dictions in this hypothesis might be distinct 
in a region that is richer and an “out-
group.” For example, within Catalonia 
(ranked fourth in income per capita in 
Spain), increasing salience of the out-group 
for those in Catalonia (the rest of Spain) 
and the in-group (Catalonia) should reduce 
support for regional redistribution.  
Section 2: Design 
To test the above hypotheses, we gath-
ered data using a web-based survey of 
4,000 respondents in Spain in July 2012. 
The survey was administered by 
Netquest, a Spanish survey firm. The 
resulting sample has a similar demo-
graphic composition to large nationally 
representative surveys in Spain (i.e. 
those fielded by the Centro de Investi-
gaciones Sociológicas) and it included 
an oversample of Catalonia (n = 1,200).7  
 
The dependent variable is whether the 
citizen prefers more or less inter-
regional redistribution. Respondents out-
side of Catalonia (n = 2,800) were ran-
7 Appendix A gives an overview of Netquest’s 
stratification and sampling strategy. The supple-
mental online appendix (SOA) compares our 
survey to others on the relevant social and demo-
graphic variables. It shows no statistically signif-
icant differences in the distributions of these 
variables between the surveys. Our sample has a 
slight oversample of younger respondents; all 
analyses that are re-estimated with weights for 
age do not change the results.  
8 
 
domly assigned to a control group and a 
treatment group with equal probabilities. 
In the control group respondents were 
first asked this policy preference. They 
were asked afterwards to place the rela-
tive income position of their own AC 
and two other randomly selected ACs, 
receiving no information. Spain has 17 
ACs and two independent cities; re-
spondents simply had to choose an inte-
ger number 1 through 19 for each AC 
(with 1 referring to the on average rich-
est AC, and 19 indicating the poorest)8.  
In the treatment group, respondents were 
asked about the relative placement of 
their own AC and two others, but they 
were then told the correct relative posi-
tion of their own AC. Individuals then 
answered the same dependent variable 
questions as the control group.  
 
This design enables us to determine 
whether accurate information about the 
respondent’s AC’s relative regional in-
come affects preferences for regional 
redistribution. It also allows us to meas-
ure the impact of respondents actually 
exogenously becoming relatively poorer 
or richer because they are learning that 
their region is poorer or richer than pre-
viously thought. In addition, the fact that 
people were asked about the relative 
placement of two randomly assigned re-
gions (in addition to their own) allows us 
to determine whether being asked to con-
sider specific regions affects these pref-
erences. 
 
We employed a similar design for resi-
dents in Catalonia but with two addition-
al treatments. For Catalonia respondents 
were randomly assigned to one of four 
experimental groups, with a .2 probabil-
ity assignment for the first two and .3 
probability assignment for the latter two. 
In the control group, respondents an-
swered the same questions as the control 
group for the rest of Spain.  In the sec-
ond experimental group, the “cultural 
treatment” group, respondents answered 
three questions that were designed to 
make the Catalan culture and language 
issue salient9, followed by the same 
question about regional redistribution. 
(After answering the dependent variable 
question, respondents in these first two 
groups were also asked to rank Catalonia 
and two other randomly chosen ACs).  In 
the third experimental group, the 
“information treatment group,” respond-
ents (as the respondents in the rest of 
Spain) were asked about the relative 
placement of Catalonia as well as two 
other randomly chosen ACs, and were 
told the correct placement of Catalonia.  
In the fourth and final group, the “both 
treatments” category, respondents were 
asked about the relative placement of 
Catalonia as well as two other randomly 
chosen ACs, and were then told the cor-
rect placement of Catalonia; they then 
8 The information question in Spanish is, “Como 
usted sabe, en España hay 17 comunidades autó-
nomas más las 2 ciudades autónomas de Ceuta y 
Melilla. Si ordenáramos estas 19 autonomías 
según su renta media, colocando a la más rica en 
la posición 1 y a la más pobre en la posición 19, 
¿en qué posición diría usted que está [región 
X]?” Appendix B gives the objective ranking of 
each AC from the INE. 
9 The three questions asked about strength of 
Catalan identification, views on Catalan lan-
guage instruction in schools, and views on Cata-
lan language autonomy. 
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answered the same three questions as in 
Group 2 designed to make the cultural 
dimension of Catalan relations salient 
and they then answered the same de-
pendent variable questions. Table 1 dis-
plays the experimental design.10  
10 The randomization checks in the SOA demon-
strate the successful randomization of the treat-
ments; no significant covariates in the Spanish 
only sample predict treatment assignment. In the 
Catalan sample, those who identify strongly as 
Catalan are slightly less likely to be assigned to 
the control group; in the discussion of the results 
for the section, all models control for degree of 
Catalan identification as well as if the respondent 
speaks Catalan as a native language (which is 
uncorrelated with treatment assignment).   
Table 1: Experimental Design 
Experimental 
Group 
Geographic 
location 
Information 
Treatment 
Catalan  
Cultural 
Prime  
Treatment 
Probability of  
Receiving Treatment 
within Geographical 
Area 
Control Group Spain excluding 
Catalonia 
No No .5 
Group 2 Spain excluding 
Catalonia 
Yes No .5 
Group 3 Catalonia No No .2 
Group 4 Catalonia No Yes .2 
Group 5 Catalonia Yes No .3 
Group 6 Catalonia Yes Yes .3 
Regarding the dependent variable, the 
regional redistribution question asked 
respondents how much they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement that the 
Spanish fiscal system should transfer 
resources from high-income regions to 
low-income regions. Response options 
for the redistribution preference question 
are very much agree, somewhat agree, 
neither agree nor disagree, somewhat 
disagree, and very much disagree, with 
“1” being “very much agree / somewhat 
agree” and “0” otherwise. 
 
Unless otherwise noted, all independent 
variables are coded as binary. Income is 
a ten-point scale corresponding to house-
hold deciles.  Education is coded on a 
three-point scale, with the categories re-
ferring to the highest level of education 
completed: primary or basic secondary, 
upper secondary, or university. Age is 
coded on a four-point scale (the increas-
ing scale intervals are 18-29, 30-39, 40-
49, 60-64). Political ideology is the 
standard 10 point scale, with 1 being 
most left and 10 being most right-wing. 
Female is coded 1 and unemployed is 
coded as 1. 
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Section 3: Results from the Control Group 
We first discuss descriptive statistics 
from the control groups to assess baseline 
preferences. For presentational clarity we 
discuss descriptive statistics and analyses 
for Spain without Catalonia, and then for 
Catalonia specifically. Appendix C pre-
sents the descriptive statistics on the de-
mographic variables of interest. 
 
A majority of respondents (52 per cent) 
in the populated-weighted sample are 
favorable to redistribution from rich to 
poor regions. The two clear outliers are 
the two culturally distinct regions of the 
Basque Country and Catalonia, where 
support plummets to 24 percent and 23 
percent, respectively. Support for region-
al redistribution is roughly the same 
across rich and poor individuals living in 
poor regions (about 60 percent), but in-
dividual income seems to matter in rich 
regions: 54 percent of rich individuals in 
rich regions support regional redistribu-
tion, but only 48 percent of poor ones.11  
  
What do people know about where their 
region is in the distribution of income? 
Figure 1 presents histograms of the dif-
ference in the actual position of a region 
and the belief of respondents (regions 
with less than 80 respondents are not in-
cluded in the graph). They are centered at 
zero, represented by the red vertical line, 
which corresponds to those respondents 
that have assigned the correct ranking to 
their own region. Those to the right of the 
red line indicate beliefs that the region 
has a relative ranking higher than the ac-
tual one; those to the left of the red line 
believe that the region has a relative rank-
ing lower than the actual one. Partially 
due to the truncated nature of the data, 
people in rich regions tend to deviate to 
the left of the right value, and people in 
poor regions to the right. For example, 
for poorer regions, 62 percent of individ-
uals believe their region is richer than it 
actually is; among richer regions, only 23 
percent of individuals believe their region 
is richer than it actually is. These patterns 
indicate that we should be cautious in in-
terpreting the treatment of giving infor-
mation on actual regional ranking as an 
average effect, as different individuals 
will of course learn whether their region 
is richer or poorer.12 The dispersion 
around the red lines indicates how much 
11 Rich and poor individuals are defined by being 
in the bottom or top five deciles; rich and poor 
regions are defined by being above or below the 
median region income.  
12 On average, individuals in rich regions are 
more likely to learn that their region is richer 
than they thought, while individuals in poor re-
gions are more likely to learn that their region is 
poorer than they thought. To partially accommo-
date this issue and to test hypotheses more di-
rectly building on previous frameworks 
(particularly hypotheses 2), we examine the im-
pact of information on the four quadrants of indi-
viduals: poor people in poor region, poor people 
in rich regions, rich individuals in rich regions, 
and rich individuals in poor regions. This analy-
sis better demonstrates how the effect of infor-
mation can vary for individuals with differing 
individual and regional incomes. Throughout the 
discussion of the results, we note that the infor-
mation effects have varying effect sizes for indi-
viduals of different incomes, some of whom are 
more likely to learn they are richer or poorer. We 
can interpret our treatment effects for those who 
believe their region is poorer or richer than it 
Descriptive statistics –  
preferences 
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We first estimate a series of logistic esti-
mation equations where the dependent 
variable is whether the respondent sup-
ports transfers from rich to poor regions. 
Overall, we do not find much confirma-
tion of Hypothesis 1. But we find partial 
confirmation of the intuition that poor 
and rich individuals will differ depend-
ing on if they live in a poor or rich re-
gion. Table 2 displays these estimations 
for Spain without Catalonia and for Cat-
alonia separately. For column 1, the rele-
vant independent variables of interest are 
regional income position as well as the 
respondent’s perceived relative position 
of the region. Without considering other 
demographic variables, the coefficient 
on relative region rank only has a mini-
mal effect on support for redistribution 
(recall that the scale is 1-19, with higher 
values indicating relatively poorer re-
gions; this eases interpretation as posi-
tive coefficients indicate greater support 
inaccuracy citizens in the region have 
about the position of their CA; the great-
est variation in perceptions is observed in 
middle-income regions. Overall, the re-
sults demonstrate some accuracy among 
some respondents, but also much imper-
fection and lack of knowledge of relative 
placement.  
actually is what the impact of such knowledge is, 
but of course, such individuals who have such 
beliefs may differ from the average population. 
As Figure 1 shows, most individuals are mistak-
en about their region’s true position.  
Figure 1. Difference in the perceived relative location of the AC and the actual position  
Estimations from the control 
group: Explaining preferences 
for inter-regional transfers 
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for regional redistribution). A one-rank 
increase in regional income leads to one 
percentage point increase in support for 
regional redistribution. But as column 1 
shows, controlling for demographic vari-
ables including individual income, gen-
der, labor market status, and residence in 
a region where linguistic/territorial is-
sues are salient (Basque Country, Na-
varre, Catalonia) dampens the effect of 
the AC relative income variable. As ex-
pected, respondents in those three areas 
are less likely to support inter-regional 
redistribution (note that these are the 
three of the four richest regions in 
Spain). Further, in almost all regions, the 
citizen’s own self-placement of the re-
gion’s income is uncorrelated with sup-
port for regional redistribution.13 This is 
some disconfirmation of hypothesis 1. 
 
Table 2 demonstrates that if we ignore 
the potential cross-pressuring effects hy-
pothesized above, individual income 
seems to be uncorrelated with support 
for such inter-regional redistribution.14  
But as column 2 of Table 2 shows, the 
indicator of whether a person is poor or 
rich and in a self-perceived rich or poor 
region matters. If we introduce simple 
binary indicators indicating which of the 
four regional/individual income quad-
rants an individual is in, where the base-
line group is that of poor individuals in 
poor regions, poor individuals in rich 
regions are more hostile towards region-
al redistribution. The estimated marginal 
effect of being a poor person in a rich 
region relative to being a poor person in 
a poor region is eight percentage points. 
These findings provide partial confirma-
tion of hypothesis 2c. However, the data 
from the control group do not confirm 
the hypotheses that in poor regions, poor 
and rich individuals differ regarding 
their preferences.  
 
Within the control group in Catalonia, 
individual income is uncorrelated with 
support for regional redistribution.  As 
Column 3 of Table 2 displays, binary 
identification with being Catalan as op-
posed to Spanish is unsurprisingly nega-
tively correlated with support for region-
al redistribution. Individuals who identi-
fy as exclusively Catalan, or more Cata-
lan than Spanish, are 16 percentage 
points less likely to support redistribu-
tion across regions. Overall, the results 
are consistent with those of Amat 
(2012), who also finds that in regions 
where second-dimensional politics are 
active there is less support for regional 
redistribution.  
13 These results hold if we use actual regional 
GDP per capita instead of regional rank; we use 
regional rank as it eases interpretation of the co-
efficients.  
14 The interaction term between income and re-
gional income is also statistically insignificant.  
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Figure 1. Difference in the perceived relative location of the AC and the actual position  
Sample: Spain exc. Catalonia Catalonia 
DV 
M1: 
Inter-reg. trans-
fers 
M2: 
Inter-reg. trans-
fers 
M3: 
Inter-reg. trans-
fers 
        
Actual region rank 0.0100     
  (0.012)     
        
Own region rank 0.014 0.0139   
  (0.012) (0.0117)   
        
Income Decile 0.020   0.027 
  (0.023)   (0.067) 
        
Female -0.29** -0.286** 0.16 
  (0.11) (0.114) (0.37) 
        
Age category 0.015*** 0.0152** 0.029** 
  (0.0051) (0.00514) (0.015) 
        
Unemployed 0.015 0.0168 0.41 
  (0.14) (0.142) (0.49) 
        
Education -0.021 -0.0213 -0.065 
  (0.088) (0.0872) (0.27) 
        
Ideology -0.044* -0.0444* -0.099 
  (0.025) (0.0253) (0.084) 
        
Resides in Basque Country -1.22*** -1.239**   
  (0.25) (0.253)   
        
Strong Catalan Identif.     -0.65*** 
      (0.15) 
        
Rich ind. in rich region   0.0203   
    (0.170)   
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Rich ind. in poor region   -0.0482   
    (0.157)   
        
Poor ind. in rich region   -0.308*   
    (0.166)   
        
        
Constant -0.16 0.0912 -0.29 
  (0.37) (0.380) (1.23) 
N 1405 1405 221 
pseudo R2 0.037 0.038 0.112 
We first present the treatment results 
testing the hypotheses for Spain exclud-
ing Catalonia. We then turn to the exper-
imental results in Catalonia specifically.  
 
We find evidence that informing individ-
uals of the true relative income position 
of their region affects preferences for 
inter-regional redistribution, partially 
confirming H3. We posit that this infor-
mation isolates the impact of actual 
changes in relative regional income on 
preferences, as respondents are learning 
if their region is in fact relatively richer 
or poorer. The treatment is thus a manip-
ulation in change in relative regional in-
come. To assess its impact, we compare 
individuals across the experimental 
groups who are all incorrect in a specific 
direction (they either believe their region 
is poorer or richer than it actually is); we 
compare the impact of the respondent 
learning about the region’s true relative 
position to those who were wrong in the 
same direction, but are not revealed their 
region’s true position. Simple difference 
of means tests between the experimental 
and control groups demonstrate the im-
pact of this information and thus actual 
change in relative regional income.  
 
First, individuals who learn that their 
region is poorer than they thought are 
more supportive of redistribution from 
wealthier regions to poorer ones (.60 
vs. .64, p<.09). This is consistent with 
hypothesis 3. But on average, we do not 
find evidence that learning that one’s 
region is relatively richer reduces sup-
port for regional redistribution.   
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Section 4: Treatment effects 
Estimations from the control 
group: Explaining preferences 
for inter-regional transfers 
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Next, we find that among those living in 
rich regions, learning that the region is 
richer than previously thought reduces 
support for regional-redistribution. 
These results are displayed in Figure 2. 
In richer regions, respondents who learn 
that the region is richer than they previ-
ously thought are less supportive of re-
gional redistribution (.60 vs. .51, p<.03).  
This result is most pronounced in the 
quadrant of poorer respondents in richer 
regions (.53 vs. .41, p<.04).15 For these 
individuals, learning that the region is 
richer than previously thought strongly 
reduces support for inter-regional redis-
tribution. This evidence is consistent 
with the control group evidence that 
poorer citizens in richer regions are most 
hostile towards redistribution across re-
gions.  
15 If we restrict the sample to respondents outside 
of the Basque Country and Navarre, this differ-
ence increases (.61 vs .44, p<.01).  
Figure 2. Treatment effects for those who learn that their region is richer by personal and 
regional income 
Note: Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
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This experimental evidence is consistent 
with some of the intuitions of why poor 
people in rich regions would be more 
hostile towards regional redistribution; 
as Beramendi argues, such individuals 
“are better off pursuing a decentralized 
system of interpersonal redistribution in 
which they are the beneficiaries of fiscal 
transfers occurring only within their re-
gion rather than engaging in class soli-
darity with the rest of the un-
ion” (Beramendi 2012, 11). But, we do 
not find similar information effects for 
citizens in poor regions; changing their 
relative regional income via information 
does not have a significant effect. Nor do 
we find for these individuals that learn-
ing that the region is poorer than ex-
pected makes respondents more likely to 
support redistribution. We discuss these 
asymmetrical effects for learning that 
one is poorer versus richer below. 
 
We also find that political ideology is an 
important moderator of the impact of 
information on preferences regarding 
regional redistribution. Left-wing indi-
viduals who learn their region is poorer 
become more supportive of regional re-
distribution, compared to left-wing indi-
viduals who do not learn this (.64 vs. 
.72, p<.05).16 Figure 3 displays this ef-
fect. No such effect exists for right-wing 
individuals. Perhaps surprisingly, left-
wing individuals who learn they are rich-
er also become less supportive of region-
al redistribution. This result of left-wing 
individuals’ preferences on regional re-
distribution being more sensitive to rele-
vant information could be due to several 
reasons. First, equality concerns are typi-
cally more central for left-leaning people 
and thus such individuals might be more 
responsive to information or shifts in 
relative income. The fact that left-wing 
individuals are capable of being more 
hostile towards regional redistribution 
indicates that altruism may be a less im-
portant component of left-wing ideolo-
gy, at least in the context of regional re-
distribution.17 Second, as we discussed 
the literature on second dimensional and 
identity salience (and as we show be-
low), preferences towards regional redis-
tribution are also likely informed by cul-
tural and national considerations; infor-
mation regarding only regional income 
may not matter for more right-wing indi-
viduals if their concern about regional 
politics is driven by identity or out-group 
considerations.18 
16 Ideology is coded as left-wing being 1-4 on the 
ideology scale and 5-10 for non-left-wing; the 
results do not change if we recode left-wing to be 
1-5.  
17 The political psychology literature on how 
core ideological beliefs affect preferences over 
policy issues is vast. See Jacoby (1991), Goren 
(2004), Jost et al. (2009). Note that arguments 
about the impact of information or changes in 
relative income on left-wing citizens’ prefer-
ences are distinct from predictions that such in-
formation will always make such citizens more 
pro-redistribution.  
18 Right-wing ideology and nationalist attitudes 
are correlated in the Spanish context; an October 
2012 CIS survey found that 64 percent of right-
wing individuals versus 37 percent of left-wing 
individuals declared themselves to be “very 
proud” of being Spanish (CIS Survey 2958). We 
also test theories of partisan bias by examining 
whether treatment effects vary by partisan pref-
erence, by estimating models conditioning on the 
partisan affiliation and interacting partisan affili-
ation with the information treatment; we find no 
statistically significant effects of party affiliation. 
See the SOA.   
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Figure 3. Treatment effects by ideology  
Note: Vertical bars indicate 95% confidence intervals 
These treatment effects on preferences 
for regional redistribution remain when 
we estimate standard logistic models 
with relevant demographic covariates as 
controls. The results are displayed in Ta-
bles 3 and 4; Table 3 examines the treat-
ment effect for respondents who learn 
that their region is poorer than they 
thought (relative to similarly incorrect 
individuals who do not learn in the con-
trol group).  Table 4 does the same com-
parison for individuals who learn their 
region is richer than they thought 
(relative to similarly incorrect individu-
als in the control group). We can inter-
pret the coefficient on the treatment as 
the causal effect of learning that the re-
gion is poorer (Table 3) or richer (Table 
4). Each of the columns for both tables 
displays estimations conditioning on the 
main groups of interest as theorized by 
the literature: poor versus rich individu-
als living in poor versus rich regions, as 
well as left-wing versus right-wing ide-
ology. The estimated marginal effect of 
information for all respondents learning 
their region is poorer than they thought 
is about five percentage points.  This ef-
fect is greater than moving one category 
up in the age variable. While the effect 
of the information treatment is modest 
and slightly imprecisely estimated 
(p<.12), it is notable that the information 
itself matters much more than individual 
or regional income. 
 
Column 2 of Table 3 compares poor 
citizens in rich regions who learn that 
their region is richer with citizens who 
are similarly incorrect but do not learn; 
18 
 
this effect is about negative 13 percent-
age points.  Note that the coefficients 
for the treatment for other categories of 
individuals are in the expected direc-
tions, but imprecisely estimated. The 
treatment has no effect on rich individ-
uals generally. Column 6 of Tables 3 
and 4 confirm the previously stated dif-
ference of means effects for left-wing 
ideology: left-wing individuals who 
learn their region is poorer become 
more supportive of regional redistribu-
tion, while left-wing individuals who 
learn their region is richer become 
more hostile towards regional redistri-
bution.19 
19 We find no evidence that the size of difference 
between the respondent’s self-placement and 
actual AC rank on preferences. The interaction 
term between the absolute difference and treat-
ment variable is statistically insignificant. The 
information results are driven more by respond-
ents learning whether they are richer or poorer as 
opposed to the amount by which they learn they 
are richer or poorer.   
Table 3. Treatment effects for those who learn region is poorer than they thought  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  All 
Low in-
come, 
rich re-
gion 
Low in-
come, 
poor re-
gion 
High 
income, 
rich re-
gion 
High 
income, 
poor re-
gion 
Left Non-left 
                
Actual region 
rank 
0.0235** 0.0700 0.0868** -0.0511 0.0631* 0.0503** 0.00520 
  (0.0114) (0.103) (0.0318) (0.0819) (0.0340) (0.0178) (0.0151) 
                
Income Decile 0.0257 -0.111 0.0561 -0.0649 -0.104 0.0697* -0.0105 
  (0.0240) (0.172) (0.0657) (0.132) (0.0765) (0.0390) (0.0309) 
                
Female -0.253** 0.682 -0.0383 -0.391 -0.574** -0.246 -0.277* 
  (0.119) (0.513) (0.179) (0.335) (0.210) (0.188) (0.157) 
                
Age category 0.130** 0.0716 0.106 -0.0931 0.252** 0.168* 0.0976 
  (0.0571) (0.239) (0.0838) (0.176) (0.101) (0.0919) (0.0741) 
                
Unemployed -0.0196 -0.195 -0.00979 0.467 -0.0588 0.211 -0.179 
  (0.152) (0.537) (0.191) (0.734) (0.347) (0.245) (0.197) 
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Education 0.0543 -0.0957 -0.268** 0.780** 0.324* 0.114 -0.00362 
  (0.0913) (0.393) (0.127) (0.330) (0.168) (0.151) (0.116) 
                
Ideology -0.0860** 0.0145 -0.0595 -0.0902 -0.130** 0.102 -0.0240 
  (0.0263) (0.109) (0.0396) (0.0735) (0.0470) (0.0887) (0.0514) 
                
Treatment 0.183 0.492 0.159 0.288 0.115 0.377** 0.0445 
  (0.116) (0.490) (0.175) (0.332) (0.202) (0.187) (0.152) 
                
Constant 0.0275 -0.297 -0.558 -0.127 -0.220 -1.324** 0.341 
  (0.354) (1.498) (0.657) (1.290) (0.922) (0.574) (0.527) 
                
pseudo R2 0.018 0.043 0.024 0.050 0.053 0.036 0.008 
N 1293 74 577 172 470 568 725 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
Table 4. Treatment effects for those who learn their region is richer than they thought 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  All 
Low in-
come, 
rich re-
gion 
Low in-
come, 
poor re-
gion 
High 
income, 
rich re-
gion 
High 
income, 
poor re-
gion 
Left Non-left 
                
Actual Region 
rank 
0.0228 0.161** -0.0182 0.0464 -0.0184 -0.00624 0.0484** 
  (0.0157) (0.0633) (0.0565) (0.0554) (0.0785) (0.0230) (0.0221) 
                
Income Decile 0.0316 -0.0270 0.101 -0.0267 0.0206 0.00676 0.0671* 
  (0.0246) (0.0984) (0.0884) (0.0848) (0.107) (0.0353) (0.0354) 
                
Gender -0.397** -0.481* -0.102 -0.511** -0.453 -0.342* -0.475** 
  (0.127) (0.271) (0.245) (0.231) (0.319) (0.184) (0.181) 
                
Age 0.112* 0.0758 0.0270 0.141 0.294* 0.0679 0.157* 
  (0.0624) (0.131) (0.118) (0.116) (0.159) (0.0895) (0.0914) 
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Unempl. 0.123 0.482 0.110 0.456 -0.774* 0.309 -0.0384 
  (0.152) (0.294) (0.247) (0.358) (0.433) (0.218) (0.219) 
                
Education 0.0307 0.249 -0.130 0.102 -0.203 0.0486 -0.0266 
  (0.0985) (0.192) (0.174) (0.208) (0.274) (0.144) (0.140) 
                
Ideology -0.00105 -0.128** -0.00183 0.0701 0.121 0.0615 -0.0265 
  (0.0278) (0.0575) (0.0539) (0.0511) (0.0774) (0.0840) (0.0598) 
                
Basque Country 
resident 
-1.169** -0.530   -1.165**   -1.725** -0.648** 
  (0.221) (0.418)   (0.343)   (0.328) (0.311) 
                
Treatment -0.0958 -0.542** 0.117 -0.0498 0.149 -0.333* 0.144 
  (0.121) (0.255) (0.235) (0.222) (0.305) (0.174) (0.174) 
                
Constant -0.151 -0.351 0.401 -0.330 0.177 0.236 -0.460 
  (0.381) (0.824) (0.979) (0.953) (1.585) (0.579) (0.612) 
                
pseudo R2 0.049 0.092 0.006 0.078 0.061 0.068 0.050 
N 1183 289 304 379 211 604 579 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
To test hypothesis 5, we now examine 
the impact of priming the out-group on 
preferences for regional redistribution, 
first focusing on Spain without Catalo-
nia. To do this we leverage an aspect of 
the design that randomly asked some 
respondents to rank linguistically distinct 
regions on the relative income scale, 
whereas other respondents were not 
asked to rank such regions.20  
We consider respondents only within the 
treatment group, as this is the only group 
in which respondents were asked to rank 
their own and other regions before being 
asked about preferences on redistribu-
tion. We focus on the potential priming 
effect of the Basque Country and Catalo-
nia because they are the most salient re-
Experimental results: priming 
the “out-group” and infor-
mation’s effect on preferences  
20 22 percent of the Spanish sample outside of 
Catalonia was asked to rank Catalonia or the 
Basque Country’s relative income.  
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gions regarding autonomy and fiscal in-
terdependence issues.21 The estimation 
results of these priming effects are dis-
played in Table 5. 
 
We find that the priming of ethnically or 
linguistically distinct regions affects 
preferences for fiscal transfers across 
regions, confirming hypothesis 5. Fur-
ther, individuals who learn they are 
poorer and are primed by evaluating one 
of the linguistically distinct regions are 
more supportive of regional redistribu-
tion than those who learn but are not 
primed. (Recall that these areas are gen-
erally thought to be among the richer 
regions). This difference is substantively 
large (.62 vs. .73, p<.02). 
 
We find that this priming effect differ-
ence in preferences for regional redistri-
bution is driven by individuals who are 
more right-wing.  Right-wing individu-
als primed to consider ethnic-
linguistically distinct regions and learn 
that they are poorer are much more like-
ly to support regional redistribution (.55 
v .70, p<.01) than right-wing individuals 
who learn they are poorer but not 
primed.  In fact, right-wing individuals 
on average who are primed to rank one 
of the linguistic out-groups are more pro
-regional redistribution (.54 v .63, 
p<.04), but this effect is driven by right-
wing individuals who learn their region 
is poorer. Among left-wing individuals 
who learn their region is poorer, the 
prime has no effect on preferences. 
 
Recall that left-wing individuals who 
learned their region was poorer also be-
came more supportive of redistribution. 
This indicates an interesting difference 
in the effect of ideology and information 
on regional redistribution preferences. 
We observed that left-wing individuals 
who learn they are poorer become more 
pro regional redistribution. The effect 
also occurs among right-wing individu-
als, but only when they are primed to 
consider linguistically distinct out-
groups as well.  One speculation is that 
right-wing individuals might view re-
gional redistribution issues through the 
“lens” of views of out-groups, whereas 
left-wing individuals are more likely to 
apply a standard economic distributional 
logic.22  
21 We check for priming results of the redistribu-
tion questions in the control group and find none; 
that is, a respondent’s answer to the question on 
redistribution does not correlate with ranking 
either the Basque Country nor Catalonia differ-
ently.  
20 We conduct a series of alternate specifications 
to test for other potential priming effects and do 
not find significant differences nor statistically 
significant coefficients on the relevant binary 
priming variables in estimations controlling for 
demographic covariates. First, we test 
“neighborhood priming” hypotheses that conjec-
ture that being primed to evaluate one’s neigh-
boring region(s) would affect preferences differ-
ently from those not primed. We test whether 
being primed by being asked to evaluate either: 
a) one bordering neighbor, b) two neighbors, c) 
two poorer neighbors, d) two richer neighbors 
has any effect on preferences, and find no effect. 
Second, we test whether being primed to evalu-
ate two richer or poorer regions affects prefer-
ences, and find little consistent robust effects on 
preferences. We do find that individuals who 
rank their region as poorer than the two other 
regions are more pro redistribution, but this ef-
fect is driven by being asked to evaluate one of 
the two ethnically/linguistically distinct regions, 
a result discussed above. See the SOA.  
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Table 5. Priming effects  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  All 
Learn 
Region is 
richer 
than 
thought 
Learn 
Region is 
poorer 
than 
thought 
Learn 
Region is 
poorer 
than 
thought, 
Left 
Learn 
Region is 
richer 
than 
thought, 
Left 
Learn 
Region is 
poorer 
than 
thought, 
non-Left 
Learn 
Region 
is richer 
than 
thought, 
non-Left 
                
Own regional rank 0.0303** 0.0546** 0.0166 0.0341 0.0167 0.0125 0.0985** 
  
(0.00772
) 
(0.0227) (0.0169) (0.0281) (0.0320) (0.0219) (0.0335) 
                
Income Decile 0.0254 0.0481 0.0159 0.126** 0.0161 -0.0591 0.0923* 
  (0.0162) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0594) (0.0490) (0.0449) (0.0514) 
                
Gender -0.321** -0.409** -0.196 -0.288 -0.343 -0.167 -0.548** 
  (0.0818) (0.182) (0.178) (0.290) (0.257) (0.232) (0.269) 
                
Age 0.127** 0.0750 0.197** 0.262* 0.0392 0.178* 0.0918 
  (0.0396) (0.0889) (0.0834) (0.142) (0.123) (0.107) (0.133) 
                
Unemployed 0.0712 0.217 -0.0951 0.215 0.358 -0.285 0.0800 
  (0.102) (0.217) (0.220) (0.352) (0.301) (0.287) (0.324) 
                
Education 0.0611 0.162 0.0972 0.0803 0.140 0.0705 0.186 
  (0.0637) (0.144) (0.133) (0.221) (0.211) (0.170) (0.209) 
                
Ideology -0.0450** 0.0412 -0.130** 0.165 -0.0207 -0.0941 -0.0282 
  (0.0179) (0.0406) (0.0379) (0.137) (0.118) (0.0731) (0.0950) 
                
Cat or BC asked -0.0344 0.0314 0.510** 0.213 -0.114 0.695** 0.204 
  (0.0965) (0.212) (0.217) (0.355) (0.296) (0.279) (0.311) 
                
Basque Country 
resident 
-1.146** -0.810**     -1.127**   -0.477 
  (0.183) (0.317)     (0.445)   (0.462) 
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Constant -0.165 -1.066* 0.190 -1.314 -0.339 0.436 -1.246 
  (0.239) (0.564) (0.508) (0.839) (0.813) (0.763) (0.929) 
N 2755 589 623 271 305 352 284 
pseudo R2 0.038 0.050 0.033 0.049 0.040 0.030 0.074 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
We now turn to discussion of the results 
of the treatments in Catalonia, examin-
ing both in-group vs. out-group priming 
as well as -information treatments. Over-
all, we find little evidence that infor-
mation (learning about one’s relative 
regional position) affected preferences 
for redistribution across regions. Com-
paring the treatment effect of respond-
ents who learn they are richer or poorer 
versus those in the control group who 
are similarly incorrect yields no infor-
mation effect.  While there are average 
differences between these three treat-
ment groups and the control groups re-
garding preferences over regional trans-
fers and independence, these differences 
are not robust to inclusion of standard 
demographic variables. We discuss in 
the conclusion why information seems 
not to affect such preferences in this re-
gion; one reason might be that the rela-
tive position of Catalonia is not im-
portant for individuals, but that other 
relevant information is. In-group prim-
ing (the second treatment group within 
Catalonia) also has no effect on redistri-
bution preferences. 
However, we find evidence that out-
group priming affects preferences for 
regional redistribution. To test hypothe-
sis 5 in Catalonia, we also assess wheth-
er priming via evaluation of randomly 
appearing regions affected preferences 
over regional redistribution.  This was 
done in the same manner as with the 
sample outside of Catalonia.  We do this 
by comparing individuals within Treat-
ment 5 (the information-only treatment). 
Each of the 18 other regions within this 
experimental group is evaluated by ap-
proximately 10 percent of the sample. 
We find that the only region that affects 
preferences over redistribution is Extre-
madura, the poorest region in Spain and 
also the region more benefited from re-
gional transfers (Paluzie 2010). The dif-
ference between those primed to evalu-
ate Extremadura and those not is dra-
matic (.30 vs .13, p<.06), and is robust to 
standard demographic covariates.  This 
result supports the hypothesis that out-
group priming—or priming of 
“beneficiaries” of redistribution—can 
dampen support of redistribution, con-
sistent with previous results on inter-
personal redistribution. Columns 4-5 of 
Table 6 display the estimations of prim-
ing results on regional redistribution in 
Catalonia.  
The impact of information on 
preferences in Catalonia:  
regional redistribution 
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Table 6: Treatment Results for Catalonia  
  Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia 
Catalonia, 
primed by 
Extremadura 
DV: 
Interreg. 
transfers 
Interreg. 
transfers 
Interreg. 
transfers 
Interreg. 
transfers 
          
Own region rank 0.030 0.018 0.0050 0.014 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.023) (0.034) 
          
Income Decile 0.0020 0.027 0.029 0.033 
  (0.046) (0.041) (0.040) (0.053) 
          
Female -0.14 -0.36* -0.24 -0.71*** 
  (0.23) (0.21) (0.20) (0.28) 
          
Age category 0.15 0.24** 0.021 0.21* 
  (0.11) (0.097) (0.092) (0.13) 
          
Unemployed -0.10 0.27 0.14 0.25 
  (0.34) (0.28) (0.29) (0.36) 
          
Education -0.10 0.27* 0.0094 0.45** 
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21) 
          
Ideology -0.054 -0.027 -0.061 0.0027 
  (0.057) (0.050) (0.047) (0.066) 
          
Cat ID -1.16*** -1.17*** -1.06*** -1.05*** 
  (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.28) 
          
Treat. 4 0.29       
  (0.23)       
          
Treat. 5   0.42**     
    (0.21)     
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Treat. 6     0.49**   
      (0.21)   
          
Cat ID         
          
Extremadura asked       -1.19** 
        (0.57) 
          
Constant -0.88 -2.19*** -0.80 -2.10*** 
  (0.69) (0.64) (0.60) (0.80) 
N 475 565 578 344 
pseudo R2 0.058 0.068 0.049 0.087 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
In this paper we present one of the few 
studies on individual preferences over 
regional redistribution, a question that 
has been surprisingly understudied given 
the recent explosion in research on fiscal 
federalism.  We provide and test some 
simple micro-foundations of such prefer-
ences across different levels in an illus-
trative multi-tiered system of Spain. We 
find that preferences of regional redistri-
bution cannot be explained completely 
by the simple baseline model of regional 
income. But, we find some support for 
recent theoretical frameworks that ex-
plicitly incorporate the interplay between 
individual and regional incomes, and 
build on this by testing assumptions 
about knowledge of regional incomes, 
ideology, and second dimensional issues. 
Regarding the basic income variables, 
we find that poorer individuals in richer 
regions are hostile towards regional re-
distribution. And consistent with the lit-
erature on second-dimensional politics 
(Amat 2012), we find that individuals in 
the richer linguistically distinct regions 
are more hostile towards regional redis-
tribution.  
 
We additionally test and confirm basic 
hypotheses with an experiment and find 
that information provision about a re-
gion’s relative income affects prefer-
ences for regional redistribution.  This 
manipulation of information is akin to 
exogenously manipulating relative in-
come; thus changes in relative regional 
income are linked to preferences in re-
gional redistribution.  Individuals who 
learn they are poorer are more support-
ive of redistribution, and those in richer 
regions who learn they are richer be-
come less supportive of such redistribu-
tion.  Importantly, this latter result is 
largely driven by poorer individuals in 
richer regions, a result consistent with 
Section 5: Conclusions and Extensions  
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our intuitions about how such individu-
als view regional redistribution.  
 
We also find that political ideology is a 
strong moderator in the relationship be-
tween regional income and preferences 
for inter-regional redistribution. Left-
wing individuals who learn that they live 
in a poorer region than they thought be-
come significantly more in favor of inter-
regional redistribution, while those who 
learn that they live in a richer region than 
they thought become more opposed. In 
contrast, right wing respondents’ views 
towards to inter-regional transfers are af-
fected more by priming of out-groups.  
 
We find less evidence of such informa-
tional effects in Catalonia, though we 
find more evidence of second-
dimensional considerations affecting 
views towards regional redistribution 
(based on priming consideration of spe-
cific regions). The null information re-
sults in Catalonia could exist because the 
issues or information regarding relative 
regional ranking are less important, or 
because the salience of the issue of inter-
regional transfers in the current public 
debate implies that Catalan respondents 
have already factored in the effect of 
these relative economic considerations in 
their preferences.  
 
Our empirical design and results have 
broader implications.  They first provide 
a gap in explaining redistribution prefer-
ences in multilevel systems. Second, 
they also demonstrate the ways in which 
providing simple information and exoge-
nously manipulating relative income can 
affect preferences for regional redistribu-
tion. Overall, we hope that this paper 
lays a foundation for examining more 
specific ways in which relevant infor-
mation as well as out-group priming af-
fects preferences over issues relevant to 
fiscal federalism, as politicians would 
surely use both to shape the nature of 
political debate on this heated topic.  
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The Netquest survey uses opt-in panels, 
based on existing databases of nationally 
representative samples of residents of 
Spain.  The panel is constrained to indi-
viduals at least 18 years of age.  The 
sample is stratified with representative 
quotas of the Spanish population by geo-
graphical area (seven geographical are-
as), age group, and gender.  Netquest 
compensates economically all partici-
pants with vouchers that can be used lat-
er to purchase goods at Netquest’s online 
store. Full documentation on sample 
compilation is available upon request. 
Appendix A: Netquest Protocol 
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Appendix B: Rankings of Regions ( 1= richest; 19 = poorest) 
1 Basque Country 
2 Navarra 
3 Madrid 
4 Catalonia 
5 Rioja 
6 Aragon 
7 Balearic Islands 
8 Castile and Leon 
9 Cantabria 
10 Asturias 
11 Galicia 
12 Valencia 
13 Ceuta 
14 Canary Islands 
15 Murcia 
16 Castile – La Mancha 
17 Melilla 
18 Andalusia 
19 Extremadura 
The ranking is made on the basis of 2011 regional GDP per capita. 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2012).  
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean (Std.Dev) Total (Percent) 
  Spain 
without Cat. 
Catalonia Spain 
without Cat. 
Catalonia 
Female     1431 (51%) 575 (48%) 
Age 38.7 (11.5) 44.6 (12.8)     
Household Size 3.08 (1.3) 2.9 (1.1)     
Ideology (1-10) 4.51 (2.2) 3.87 (2.04)     
Income Decile 5.5 (2.8) 6.3 (2.67)     
Education (3 categories) 2.44 (.67) 2.44 (.66)     
Unemployed     594 (21.2%)  180 (15%) 
Identifies as More Catalan 
than Spanish 
      616 (52%) 
Catalan Language Native       566 (47%) 
30 
 
Supplemental Appendix 
SOA Table A1. Comparison of Samples. Spain (without Catalonia) 
Variable Netquest survey National Representative Sur-
vey 
Survey 
Female Women: 51% Women: 51% CIS 2976. January 2013 
Age Mean: 38.7% (sd: 11.5) 
18-24: 12.35% 
25-34: 26.92% 
35-44: 29.87% 
45-55: 21.02% 
55+: 9.84% 
Mean: 47.52% (sd: 17.6) 
18-24: 8.75% 
25-34: 20.01% 
35-44: 20.85% 
45-54: 17.94% 
55+: 32.45% 
CIS 2976. January 2013 
Vote recall (Nov. 
11 elections) 
  
PSOE: 19.11% 
PP: 27.32% 
IU: 9.21% 
UPyD: 8.32% 
PSOE: 22.22% 
PP: 30.35% 
IU: 5.68% 
UPyD: 3.51% 
CIS 2976. January 2013 
Ideology (1-10) 4.51 (sd: 2.2) 4.85 (sd: 1.84) CIS 2976. January 2013 
Education 
  
Primary or basic second-
ary: 10.17% 
Upper secondary: 36.87% 
University: 52.96% 
  
Primary or basic secondary: 
45.02% 
Upper secondary: 30.16% 
University: 24.82% 
  
CIS 2976. January 2013 
Unemployed 21.2% 26.31% CIS 2976. January 2013 
Income We define income deciles based on the information INE’s 
Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (The national representa-
tive survey used in international studies on income distribu-
tion such as the Luxembourg Income Study). Perfect repre-
sentativeness of the survey means that 10 % of the sample 
fall into each decile. The actual percentages for each decile 
are the following: 
1st : 8.25%; 2nd: 11.25%; 3rd: 9.71%; 4th: 10.25%; 5th: 
10.21%; 6th:10.54%; 7th:10.11%; 8th: 11.29%; 9th: 10.93%; 
10th: 7.46% 
  
INE, Encuesta de Con-
diciones de Vida 2011. 
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SOA Table A2. Comparison of Samples. Catalonia 
Variable Netquest survey National Representative Sur-
vey 
Survey 
Female Women: 51.0% Women: 50.7% CIS 2976. January 2013 
Age Mean: 38.7% (sd: 11.5) 
18-24: 9.7% 
25-34: 15.65% 
35-44: 19.14% 
45-55: 28.41% 
55+: 27.10% 
Mean: 47.52% (sd: 17.6) 
18-24: 7.81% 
25-34: 20.65% 
35-44: 20.15% 
45-54: 17.88% 
55+: 33.5% 
CIS 2976. January 2013 
Vote recall 
(Nov. 11 elec-
tions) 
  
PSOE: 16.83% 
PP: 9.42% 
IU: 8.92% 
UPyD: 1% 
CiU: 19.5% 
  
PSOE: 20.54% 
PP: 7.92% 
IU: 8.66% 
UPyD: 1.49% 
CiU: 12.38% 
  
CIS 2976. January 2013 
Ideology (1-10) 3.87 (sd: 2.04) 3.94 (sd: 1.84) CIS 2976. January 2013 
Education 
  
Primary or basic secondary: 
10.09% 
Upper secondary: 39.19% 
University: 50.71% 
  
Primary or basic secondary: 
40.1% 
Upper secondary: 35.5% 
University: 24.5% 
  
CIS 2976. January 2013 
Unemployed 
  
15.1% 26.98% CIS 2976. January 2013 
Income We define income deciles based on the information INE’s 
Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida (The national representative 
survey used in international studies on income distribution 
such as the Luxembourg Income Study). Perfect representa-
tiveness of the survey means that 10 % of the sample fall into 
each decile. The actual percentages for each decile are the fol-
lowing: 
1st : 5.25%; 2nd: 6.42%; 3rd: 7.33%; 4th: 8.17%; 5th: 10.5%; 
6th:11.25%; 7th:11.33%; 8th: 13.25%; 9th: 14.92%; 10th: 11.58% 
  
INE, Encuesta de Con-
diciones de Vida 2011. 
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SOA Table B: Randomization Checks 
  Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6 
  Spain exc Cat Spain exc Cat Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia Catalonia 
Age -0.00237 0.00237 -0.00507 -0.00108 -0.00693 0.0116** 
  (0.00348) (0.00348) (0.00609) (0.00585) (0.00527) (0.00534) 
              
Region rank -0.00281 0.00281         
  (0.00672) (0.00672)         
              
Female -0.0202 0.0202 -0.0637 -0.101 -0.0106 0.137 
  (0.0789) (0.0789) (0.153) (0.146) (0.132) (0.131) 
              
Ideology 0.00544 -0.00544 0.0628* 0.00913 -0.0152 -0.0394 
  (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0364) (0.0352) (0.0319) (0.0319) 
              
Unemployed -0.0638 0.0638 -0.229 0.0682 0.160 -0.0503 
  (0.0987) (0.0987) (0.230) (0.212) (0.189) (0.190) 
              
HH size 0.0227 -0.0227 -0.00609 -0.0223 0.126** -0.103* 
  (0.0331) (0.0331) (0.0670) (0.0645) (0.0584) (0.0588) 
              
Income decile 0.00189 -0.00189 -0.0327 0.0118 0.0161 -0.00132 
  (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0306) (0.0295) (0.0265) (0.0264) 
              
Educ cat -0.0429 0.0429 0.124 0.176 -0.0710 -0.152 
  (0.0613) (0.0613) (0.120) (0.116) (0.101) (0.100) 
              
_cons 0.186 -0.186 -1.485** -1.684** -0.840* -0.595 
  (0.270) (0.270) (0.535) (0.516) (0.461) (0.463) 
N 2756 2756 1183 1183 1183 1183 
pseudo R2 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.010 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table C1: Non effects when primed to rank neighboring regions, for those 
who learn they are poorer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
All 
Low in-
come, rich 
region 
Low in-
come, poor 
region 
High in-
come, rich 
region 
High in-
come, poor 
region 
Left Non-left 
                
Region Rank 0.0177 -0.0517 0.0641 0.0297 0.121** 0.0364 0.0113 
  (0.0169) (0.169) (0.0471) (0.139) (0.0512) (0.0281) (0.0217) 
                
Income 
decile 
0.0158 -0.0470 0.107 -0.224 -0.0420 0.125** -0.0573 
  (0.0349) (0.289) (0.0932) (0.228) (0.111) (0.0594) (0.0446) 
                
Female -0.190 0.424 -0.292 -0.399 -0.118 -0.294 -0.138 
  (0.177) (0.937) (0.263) (0.559) (0.316) (0.291) (0.230) 
                
Age 0.208** 0.728 0.206* -0.178 0.230 0.267* 0.190* 
  (0.0834) (0.503) (0.121) (0.283) (0.149) (0.142) (0.107) 
                
Neigh 
Asked 
0.0824 1.232 0.356 0.580 -0.475 -0.0368 0.187 
  (0.189) (1.072) (0.283) (0.727) (0.312) (0.321) (0.239) 
                
Unemployed -0.0980 -0.129 0.0897 -1.461 -0.152 0.214 -0.311 
  (0.219) (0.915) (0.281) (1.321) (0.475) (0.351) (0.286) 
                
Educ 
cat 
0.0885 0.880 -0.283 1.020* 0.303 0.0794 0.0553 
  (0.132) (0.659) (0.187) (0.569) (0.245) (0.221) (0.169) 
                
Ideology -0.125** -0.248 -0.105* -0.359** -0.0993 0.162 -0.0679 
  (0.0376) (0.204) (0.0547) (0.135) (0.0665) (0.137) (0.0719) 
                
_cons 0.220 -2.041 -0.181 2.140 -1.559 -1.289 0.365 
  (0.507) (2.162) (0.970) (2.005) (1.294) (0.836) (0.762) 
N 623 36 288 77 222 271 352 
pseudo R2 0.026 0.134 0.042 0.154 0.052 0.048 0.018 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table C2: Non effects when primed to rank neighboring regions, for those 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
All 
Low in-
come, rich 
region 
Low in-
come, poor 
region 
High in-
come, rich 
region 
High in-
come, poor 
region 
Left Non-left 
                
Region Rank 0.0874** 0.189** -0.0400 0.179** 0.00720 0.0630** 0.118** 
  (0.0190) (0.0718) (0.0873) (0.0620) (0.128) (0.0264) (0.0282) 
                
Income decile 0.0514 -0.0382 0.109 -0.0582 0.156 0.0171 0.0987* 
  (0.0347) (0.148) (0.126) (0.115) (0.173) (0.0488) (0.0511) 
                
Female -0.350* -0.717* 0.0663 -0.449 -0.241 -0.248 -0.502* 
  (0.179) (0.396) (0.370) (0.309) (0.491) (0.251) (0.266) 
                
Age 0.0608 0.0274 -0.0798 0.170 0.426 0.0460 0.0760 
  (0.0879) (0.192) (0.166) (0.162) (0.260) (0.121) (0.131) 
                
Neigh 
Asked 
0.00894 0.506 -0.0315 -0.349 -0.599 0.128 -0.0852 
  (0.178) (0.385) (0.360) (0.328) (0.500) (0.257) (0.255) 
                
Unemployed 0.189 0.526 0.308 0.410 -1.038* 0.349 0.0740 
  (0.217) (0.416) (0.356) (0.527) (0.609) (0.307) (0.323) 
                
Educ cat 0.159 0.421 -0.151 0.248 0.127 0.150 0.173 
  (0.144) (0.303) (0.264) (0.296) (0.436) (0.210) (0.208) 
                
Ideology 0.0411 -0.209** 0.127 0.123* 0.243** -0.0204 -0.0179 
  (0.0404) (0.0854) (0.0902) (0.0734) (0.115) (0.117) (0.0943) 
                
_cons -1.428** -1.123 0.362 -1.538 -2.522 -1.003 -1.434 
  (0.548) (1.229) (1.505) (1.300) (2.508) (0.787) (0.903) 
N 589 146 148 197 98 305 284 
pseudo R2 0.041 0.101 0.019 0.061 0.106 0.024 0.070 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table D1: Ranking two other regions as poorer or richer and effect if one 
learns region is poorer  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
All 
Low in-
come, rich 
region 
Low in-
come, poor 
region 
High in-
come, rich 
region 
High in-
come, poor 
region 
Left Non-left 
                
Region 
rank 
-0.000703 0.175 0.0141 -0.0204 0.130** 0.0259 -0.0112 
  (0.0220) (0.199) (0.0562) (0.188) (0.0596) (0.0344) (0.0302) 
                
Income 
decile 
-0.00982 0.225 0.129 -0.0170 -0.120 0.0933 -0.0879* 
  (0.0394) (0.341) (0.106) (0.269) (0.129) (0.0649) (0.0514) 
                
Female -0.159 0.347 -0.204 0.0378 -0.345 -0.0647 -0.259 
  (0.199) (1.167) (0.304) (0.622) (0.349) (0.322) (0.260) 
                
Age 0.211** 0.663 0.180 -0.161 0.339** 0.245 0.201* 
  (0.0923) (0.691) (0.136) (0.326) (0.167) (0.156) (0.117) 
                
Rank 
poorer 
other2 
0.215 . 0.676* -18.96 -0.475 0.0952 0.259 
  (0.254) . (0.356) (2969.2) (0.422) (0.412) (0.327) 
                
Rank rich-
er other2 
0.0441 1.299 0.245 -17.39 -0.120 0.169 -0.0709 
  (0.251) (1.503) (0.376) (2969.2) (0.395) (0.398) (0.338) 
                
Unem-
ployed 
-0.120 -0.908 0.120 -1.107 -0.335 0.190 -0.242 
  (0.245) (0.999) (0.326) (1.298) (0.525) (0.403) (0.319) 
                
Educ cat 0.134 1.198 -0.346 0.801 0.556** 0.103 0.144 
  (0.151) (0.824) (0.225) (0.698) (0.278) (0.245) (0.198) 
                
Ideology -0.139** -0.453 -0.0951 -0.375** -0.148* 0.132 -0.0352 
  (0.0437) (0.283) (0.0666) (0.154) (0.0758) (0.157) (0.0848) 
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_cons 0.394 -4.054 0.407 18.38 -1.920 -1.184 0.302 
  (0.595) (3.071) (1.146) (2969.2) (1.441) (0.991) (0.906) 
N 483 29 216 60 178 211 272 
pseudoR2 0.026 0.160 0.045 0.163 0.081 0.031 0.022 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
SOA Table D2: Ranking two other regions as poorer or richer and effect if one 
learns region is richer 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
Region 
rank 
0.0678** 0.218** -0.0315 0.160** 0.0513 0.0502 0.0953** 
  (0.0249) (0.0879) (0.101) (0.0751) (0.158) (0.0356) (0.0361) 
                
Income 
decile 
0.0500 -0.0139 0.126 -0.191 0.153 0.00762 0.101* 
  (0.0395) (0.176) (0.141) (0.141) (0.205) (0.0553) (0.0586) 
                
Female -0.473** -0.675 0.0733 -0.702* -0.546 -0.335 -0.587** 
  (0.203) (0.453) (0.426) (0.367) (0.592) (0.286) (0.299) 
                
Age -0.0150 -0.0261 -0.184 0.0454 0.484 -0.0757 0.0523 
  (0.102) (0.210) (0.197) (0.199) (0.308) (0.139) (0.155) 
                
Rank poor-
er other2 
0.0962 0.620 -0.823* 0.758 0.291 -0.0461 0.162 
  (0.232) (0.519) (0.453) (0.464) (0.636) (0.330) (0.337) 
                
Rank richer 
other2 
-0.385 -0.245 -0.0330 0.0868 0.250 -0.638* -0.164 
  (0.274) (0.556) (0.937) (0.435) (1.089) (0.379) (0.415) 
                
Unem-
ployed 
0.00718 0.396 0.153 -0.217 -0.840 0.226 -0.195 
  (0.244) (0.483) (0.401) (0.626) (0.776) (0.339) (0.364) 
                
Educ cat 0.0790 0.291 -0.153 0.331 -0.0697 0.0243 0.0870 
  (0.165) (0.353) (0.306) (0.351) (0.494) (0.237) (0.247) 
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Ideology 0.0340 -0.180* 0.0297 0.144* 0.259* -0.0430 0.0347 
  (0.0456) (0.0953) (0.109) (0.0830) (0.133) (0.131) (0.108) 
                
_cons -0.704 -0.908 1.447 -0.543 -3.086 0.139 -1.322 
  (0.643) (1.489) (1.763) (1.487) (2.870) (0.917) (1.053) 
N 469 118 118 154 79 245 224 
pseudo R2 0.048 0.126 0.038 0.093 0.116 0.042 0.072 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Table E: Lack of information effects by partisan vote intention  
  PSOE supporters, 
learn richer 
PSOE supporters, 
learn poorer 
PP supporters, 
learn richer 
PP supporters, 
learn poorer 
          
Region rank 0.0569 0.0154 0.0641 0.00483 
  (0.0382) (0.0368) (0.0392) (0.0253) 
          
Income decile 0.0234 0.00818 0.0871 -0.0111 
  (0.0643) (0.0714) (0.0718) (0.0546) 
          
Female -0.645* -1.002** -1.179** -0.0546 
  (0.345) (0.369) (0.382) (0.287) 
          
Age 0.160 0.299* 0.230 0.0621 
  (0.174) (0.166) (0.183) (0.138) 
          
Unemployed 0.607 0.587 0.106 -0.238 
  (0.457) (0.436) (0.448) (0.343) 
          
Educ cat 0.0237 0.324 0.192 -0.0264 
  (0.253) (0.253) (0.305) (0.227) 
          
Ideology 0.121 -0.106 -0.00976 -0.154* 
  (0.106) (0.0978) (0.106) (0.0826) 
          
Treatment 0.0336 0.123 0.346 -0.324 
  (0.331) (0.339) (0.369) (0.275) 
          
_cons -0.439 -0.0887 -1.373 1.791* 
  (0.984) (1.010) (1.435) (0.985) 
N 183 201 141 241 
pseudo R2 0.052 0.084 0.099 0.019 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 
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SOA Figure A. Screenshot of the AC’s Placement Question 
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